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THE DOUBLE BOTTOM LINE: CAN
CONSTITUENCY STATUTES PROTECT
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE CORPORATIONS
STUCK IN REVLON LAND?
Anthony Bisconti*
Should corporate directors be allowed to sacrifice shareholder returns
in an acquisition in order to engage the corporation in socially
responsible activity? The traditional model of corporate law,
enunciated most influentially by the Delaware courts, emphasizes
shareholder benefit. Where a corporation is being sold, this traditional
approach limits directors' fiduciary duties to one simple goal:
obtaining the highest value possible for shareholders. The constituency
statute, a fairly modern advent, operates against this strong tradition
and may serve as a mechanism to promote corporate social
responsibility in the acquisition context. The current constituency
statute framework, however, inadequately protects social responsibility
concerns during acquisitions. To help guide courts on this issue,
legislatures must adopt a model that explicitly identifies preferred
corporate social responsibility policies. Otherwise, corporate social
responsibility will remain diluted by the traditional approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are on the board of directors of Healthy Drink, a
publicly traded corporation that imports its main product-a health
beverage-from the Amazon rainforest.' In addition to selling only
certified organic products, Healthy Drink sustains and restores
20,000 acres of the Amazon rainforest. Healthy Drink also supports
cooperatives and indigenous communities. The corporation is a
. J.D. Candidate, May 2009, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A. in Rhetoric and
Legal Studies, May 2005, University of California, Berkeley. My endless gratitude to Professor
Therese Maynard for her tireless efforts and contributions. Special thanks to my amazing support
system of friends and family, who I can always count on to give me a dose of reality when I need
it most.
1. This hypothetical company is based on Guayaki Yerba Mate, a tea business and certified
B Corporation. See Guayaki Organic Yerba Mate, http://www.guayaki.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2009).
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member of the Fair Trade Federation, 2 which means that the
company pays more than market price for its ingredients. This
allows Healthy Drink to provide a living wage to growers and
suppliers. Additionally, Healthy Drink offsets its carbon emissions
by purchasing solar and other green power and by utilizing
production processes that limit the volume of emissions that the
company creates.
Healthy Drink has been moderately successful, consistently
turning out steadily increasing profits from year to year. Healthy
Drink is approached by two other companies that are prepared to
enter the bidding process to acquire Healthy Drink in an all-cash
transaction.3 The first company ("Bidder 1") sees great earning
potential in the Healthy Drink brand by shedding "wasteful"
expenses associated with reforestation, the purchasing of green
energy, and and the use of more expensive (although
environmentally-friendly) production processes. Consequently,
Bidder 1 offers a substantial premium over the current share price to
acquire Healthy Drink.
The second company ("Bidder 2") also sees a large upside to
acquiring Healthy Drink. Like Healthy Drink, Bidder 2 prides itself
on its own socially responsible initiatives. Bidder 2 will continue
Healthy Drink's socially responsible initiatives but lacks the capital
possessed by Bidder 1. Therefore, Bidder 2 can only offer a slight
premium over Healthy Drink's current stock price.
As a board member, you are faced with a dilemma. On the one
hand, you could vote to sell Healthy Drink to Bidder 1 and obtain the
highest value for the company. However, this requires sacrificing
2. The Fair Trade Federation is an association of businesses committed to creating social
and economic opportunities for otherwise marginalized communities of producers and suppliers.
Members meet or exceed local, national, or international minimum pay standards, promote equal
pay among genders, and ensure prompt payment. Members also provide compensation that
reflects the true cost of labor, materials and sustainable growth, and ensure safe working
conditions. Fair Trade Federation, About Fair Trade, http://www.fairtradefederation.org/ht/d/
sp/i/178/pid/178 (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
3. The hypothetical involves two all-cash offers at different values to clearly draw attention
to the issue faced by the board. Corporate acquisitions can be financed in any number of ways,
including various combinations of cash, stock, bonds, and other securities. The valuation of non-
cash consideration can greatly impact the true value of a given offer due to the uncertainty of the
value of securities at the time of payment versus the time of offer. This means that two offers of
equal face value, one all-cash and the other containing securities, may not truly be equal. The
comparison of two all-cash offers at disparate values avoids valuation issues beyond the scope of
this Note.
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the continuation of the company's environmental and supplier-
friendly mission. Alternatively, you could vote to sell to Bidder 2 for
a lower value and thereby ensure the continuation of Healthy Drink's
corporate philosophy.'
While the story of Healthy Drink is hypothetical, it illustrates a
genuine and increasingly frequent dilemma faced by many corporate
directors. This is because many corporations, in response to the
multitude of environmental and social issues facing our nation and
world, have resolved to pursue socially responsible initiatives in
addition to profits. Such initiatives include reinvesting profits to
develop supplier and producer communities, prohibiting exploitative
labor practices, and exceeding minimum environmental
requirements.'
This pursuit of the "double bottom line"6 is best exemplified by
so-called B Corporations. B Corporations are purpose-driven
businesses that require adherence to certain social and environmental
standards in order to receive B Corporation certification. 7 The B
Corporation movement is just one specific example of a growing
trend of socially and environmentally aware companies driven by
more than the mere desire for profits.8
This Note explores the extent to which a fairly modem
legislative advent-the constituency statute-can provide guidance
to a board facing the dilemma presented by the Healthy Drink
hypothetical. As this Note describes in greater detail below, the
early common law and its subsequent codification in many states
requires directors to act solely for the shareholders' benefit.9
Constituency statutes permit board members to consider
nonshareholder interests when exercising their corporate decision-
making authority. In terms of general business decisions,
4. Of course, the third option is for the board to choose not to sell to either bidder. For the
purposes of this hypothetical, however, it is assumed that the sale of the company is inevitable.
5. See infra notes 262-266 and accompanying text.
6. The "double bottom line" is a way to describe a social enterprise's balance of financial
viability and social impact. Jerr Boschee, Doing Good While Doing Well, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Oct. 19, 2008, at G1.
7. Certified B Corporation, About B Corp., http://www.bcorporation.net/about (last visited
Feb. 21, 2009).
8. See Joe Nocera, The Paradoxes of Businesses as Do-Gooders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
2006, at C 1.
9. See infra Part II.B.1.
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constituency statutes do not present any novel issues because as
residual claimants, shareholders have the opportunity to gamer
indirect benefits from socially responsible corporate activity.
Moreover, in the absence of any indirect benefit to the shareholders,
the potential negative impact of a social initiative on profits is not
typically apparent when the corporation is engaged in numerous
activities as a going concern.
In contrast, when a corporation is being sold, the shareholders of
the target corporation typically lose their continuing interest in the
business. Courts significantly limit the board's generally broad,
decision-making latitude once the company is up for sale. 10 When
the sale would result in a change of control of the corporation, courts
have found that the board has a duty to seek the maximum
shareholder return through the sale of the company. l" To simplify,
"change of control" refers to the mandated sale of the corporation,
which leaves the shareholders in a qualitatively different position
post-transaction than they were pre-transaction. 12
Part II of this Note examines the divergence between the
traditional view of directors' duties and the fairly modern
constituency statutes. As will be discussed, the traditional-duty
analysis generally imposes on directors the duty to act with the
shareholders' best interests in mind. Constituency statutes, adopted
by a majority of the states," permit the board to consider the
interests of nonshareholder constituencies when exercising decision-
making authority.
Part III examines the extent to which the traditional-duty
framework prevents directors from engaging the corporation in
socially responsible activity. This Note argues that while
10. See infra Part II.B.I.c.
11. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
12. The circumstances constituting a change of control transaction are fact-intensive and not
subject to a concrete definition. See Paramount Comm'ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1989). The qualitative difference refers to either the shareholders being cashed out,
meaning they must sell their shares to the acquiring entity, or the transaction representing the
shareholders' last chance to receive a control premium. See Paramount Comm'ns, Inc. v. QVC
Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
13. As of the writing of this Note, the following states have enacted constituency statutes:
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
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constituency statutes do provide a tool that directors may
theoretically invoke to circumvent this barrier, ultimately, the
statutes do not do enough to protect social initiatives when the
corporation is up for sale. This section identifies two main factors
contributing to this failure. First, state legislatures have yet to clearly
reconcile public policy preferences with respect to the two
competing ideals: shareholder primacy and corporate social
responsibility. Second, constituency statutes, as presently
formulated, do not provide the interpretative guidance required to
enable the courts to break from the interpretive framework of the
traditional-duty analysis.
Section IV recommends a set of modifications to the current
constituency statutes that will enable effective protection of
corporate social responsibility in the acquisition setting. While
constituency statutes may not always yield an optimal outcome, the
economic collapse in the early twenty-first century 4 demonstrates
that, despite the arguments of some commentators, 15 strict profit
maximization is not the most efficient long-term business strategy,
either. This Note argues that by emphasizing the importance of
interests unrelated to profits, constituency statutes may foster more
sustainable businesses and a more sustainable economy.
Section V explains the rationale for this proposed model. This
section discusses how many socially responsible entrepreneurs are
concerned with the reality that, when faced with a takeover, their
company may be forced to sacrifice its principles for profits. In
addition, this section argues that in many circumstances, corporate
social responsibility is preferred over wealth maximization because it
permits companies to enhance the interests of a broader range of
constituents.
Finally, Section VI concludes that the proposed statutory
framework can be a potential tool for administering corporate social
responsibility, thereby strengthening corporations by providing long-
term benefits.
14. See Chris Plummer, We're All to Blame for this Financial Mess, MARKETWATCH, Oct.
13, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/were-all-blame-fmancial-mess/story.aspx?g
uid={E231 A348-3902-4C5D-A94D-3CB70FED3BEA}&dist-msr7.
15. See infra note 31; see also infra notes 192-194 and accompanying text.
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II. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
In the world of corporate governance, the board of directors is
responsible for managing the corporation's business affairs. 16
Typically, all corporate powers are exercised at the discretion of the
board. This discretion is subject to shareholder approval in certain
circumstances. "7
According to the traditional corporate governance approach,
directors have a duty to exercise corporate powers with the purpose
of maximizing the corporation's profits, thereby maximizing
shareholder wealth. "8 This approach focuses on the financial benefit
to shareholders and is often referred to as the "shareholder primacy"
model. "  Although nonshareholder constituencies2 ° do have an
interest in the decisions directors make, their interests are generally
protected through means other than fiduciary duties, such as
contractual provisions. 2 Shareholders, however, are not protected
by express contractual provisions. 2  Thus, statutes impose fiduciary
duties on directors to prevent the oppression of shareholders by
management. 23
16. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (Deering 2008); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141
(2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2002).
17. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 309.
18. See infra notes 50-61 and accompanying text.
19. See Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
497, 546 (1992); see also Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corporate Building Blocks: Shareholder
Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and Human Rights Accountability, 43
AM. Bus. L.J. 365, 369-70 (2006).
20. The phrase "nonshareholder constituencies" typically refers to employees, creditors, and
suppliers. See Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1156, 1163 (1993). For purposes of this Note, the phrase will refer to any entity that has an
interest in the corporation other than the shareholders.
21. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 24-25 (1991). For example, employees are commonly identified as a
nonshareholder constituency which has a vested interest in the decisions the board makes.
Employees are able to protect their interest through means such as collective bargaining
agreements and employment agreements.
22. See C. A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical
Retrospective for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77, 88 (2002). But see
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385,
1397-1401 (2008) (discussing the nexus of contracts theory, which stands for the proposition that
the corporation is at the center of numerous relationships, both with shareholders and
stakeholders, and that these relationships essentially hinge on contractual-like obligations even in
the absence of any express contract).
23. See Wells, supra note 22.
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A. Corporate Social Responsibility
Despite the traditional approach to corporate governance, which
focuses on maximizing shareholder wealth, there is a continuing
trend among corporations to practice corporate social responsibility
("CSR"). 24  Some corporations engage in socially responsible
behavior for the sake of behaving responsibly, while others engage in
such behavior as a means to achieve greater profits. Before
discussing the ability of a company to engage in CSR, it is helpful to
establish the parameters of what CSR means in this analysis.25 CSR
has various potential components, including charitable donations,
environmentally friendly initiatives, and enhanced employee
benefits, among others.26  For the purposes of this Note, CSR is
defined simply as the sacrifice of corporate profits for the public
benefit.27 This definition highlights the controversy surrounding the
extent to which corporations can divert profits from shareholders in
order to advance nonshareholder interests. 25
Corporations are creations of state law.29 Consequently, the
rules of corporate governance are, for the most part, administered by
24. See Kellye Y. Testy, Linking Progressive Corporate Law with Progressive Social
Movements, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2002).
25. The term "corporate social responsibility" is fluid and has different meanings depending
on the context. See Dow Votaw, Genius Becomes Rare, in THE CORPORATE DILEMMA:
TRADITIONAL VALUES VERSUS CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 11, 11-12 (Dow Votaw & Prakash
Sethi eds., 1973). As Votaw writes:
[I]t means something, but not always the same thing, to everybody. To some it
conveys the idea of legal responsibility or liability; to others it means socially
responsible behavior in an ethical sense; to still others the meaning transmitted is that
of "responsible for," in a causal mode; many simply equate it with "charitable
contributions"; some take it to mean socially "conscious" or "aware"; many of those
who embrace it most fervently see it as a mere synonym for "legitimacy," in the
context of "belonging" or being proper or valid; a few see it as a sort of fiduciary duty
imposing higher standards of behavior on businessmen than on citizens at large.
Id.
26. See id.
27. See Finer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 744 (2005) (using a similarly narrowed definition of CSR as sacrificing corporate
profits for the public benefit).
28. It is not necessarily true, however, that shareholder interests and the interests of other
constituencies are mutually exclusive. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996); see also
infra notes 243-255 and accompanying text.
29. See Seven Springs Farm, Inc. v. Croker, 801 A.2d 1212, 1216 (Pa. 2002).
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the states.3 °  As a result, the precise contours of corporate
governance vary in certain respects from state to state. Nonetheless,
the prevailing view among economists, attorneys, business leaders,
and commentators appears to be that corporate directors have a
fiduciary duty to maximize profits for the benefit of the
shareholders. 31 Moreover, case law supports this duty. 32 On its face,
this duty appears to doom CSR, since CSR means sacrificing profits
for public benefit. " However, judicial deference to the decisions of
business people typically allows corporations and directors to avoid
otherwise successful legal challenges to their decisions to act in
accordance with CSR, at least with respect to general business
decisions. "
B. The Legality of Corporate Social Responsibility
The common law has shaped the responsibilities that corporate
directors have with respect to shareholders and nonshareholder
constituencies. 35  The most clearly enunciated of these
responsibilities are the fiduciary duties owed by the directors to the
corporation and its shareholders. 36
1. Responsibilities to Shareholders: Fiduciary Duties
Although codified in most states, the fiduciary duties of
directors have their origins in the common law. 37 Courts began to
impose fiduciary duties on directors to ensure that directors did not
30. See id. While states are generally responsible for formulating corporate governance
rules, some aspects are preempted by federal law. See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W.
MARKHAM, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS COMBINATIONS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 29 (2003) (demonstrating that securities regulations promulgated at the federal level
impact certain aspects of corporate governance, particularly with respect to acquisition planning
and execution).
3 1. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 126 (arguing that "there is one and only one social
responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its
profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free
competition without deception or fraud.").
32. See infra Part II.B.1.
33. See Elhauge, supra note 27, at 744.
34. See infra Part II.B.l.b.
35. D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 395 (2004).
36. See id.
37. See id. Interestingly (but perhaps not surprisingly), Delaware has left the creation and
development of directors' fiduciary duties strictly in the hands of the judiciary. Id.
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manage the corporation negligently or for their own benefit. In most
states, directors can be held personally liable for breaching their
fiduciary duties. "
Fiduciary duties generally operate to ensure that the board of
directors manages the company with the best interests of the
shareholders in mind.39 This obligation to maximize benefit to
shareholders is commonly labeled as "shareholder primacy."4 The
shareholder-primacy model is a theory of corporate governance that
requires directors to make decisions with the ultimate goal of
maximizing shareholder returns.4 In general terms, directors owe
the corporation and the shareholders the fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty in their good faith exercise of corporate authority. 42
a. Traditional duties: Loyalty and care
The fiduciary duty of loyalty imposes on directors the obligation
to consider and approve only those actions that he or she believes are
in the best interest of the corporation.43 Self-dealing by a corporate
director is the quintessential example of a breach of the duty of
loyalty. 44 Self-dealing occurs when a director takes a personal
benefit to the exclusion or detriment of the corporation and/or its
shareholders. 4"
38. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 (2002). Despite potential liability, most states
have so-called "rain-coat" provisions, which allow corporate charters to contain provisions
limiting or negating the directors' personal liability. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7)
(2008) (noting that the certificate of incorporation may set forth "[a] provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary
damages for breach of fiduciary duty as a director ... ").
39. See Jonathan D. Springer, Corporate Constituency Statutes: Hollow Hopes and False
Fears, 1999 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 85, 106 (1999) (noting how management's fiduciary duties serve
to ensure that shareholder interest will be protected).
40. Rock, supra note 19; Dhir, supra note 19, at 369-70.
41. Rock, supra note 19, at 546.
42. See Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 206 (Del. 2006).
43. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
44. See id. at 510 ("The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the
corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest."); see also
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952) ("It is a
cardinal principle of corporate law that a director cannot, at the expense of the corporation, make
an unfair profit from his position.").
45. See Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447, 452
(Iowa 1988).
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In addition to the duty of loyalty, corporate directors must also
adhere to their duty of care. 4 6 The duty of care obligates a director to
handle the corporation's affairs with the level of care of a reasonable
director in similar circumstances.47 Accordingly, a director breaches
this duty whenever he or she fails to manage the corporation's affairs
with such reasonable care.48 Perhaps most commonly, directors
breach their duty of care by failing to properly inform themselves
before making major corporate decisions. "
b. Business judgment rule
The discussion so far suggests that fiduciary duties prohibit CSR
because sacrificing shareholder profits for public benefit arguably
constitutes a breach of these fiduciary duties. In fact, this was
precisely the outcome in many early cases. For example, in Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co.,5" the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated the
authority of the Ford Motor Company to sacrifice profits in the name
of social responsibility. 51 Henry Ford and his board of directors
exercised their discretion to withhold the distribution of Ford's
capital earnings as a shareholder dividend. 52 The funds were instead
to be reinvested in the company to benefit its employees. "
According to Henry Ford, the board withheld the dividend so that the
company would be able "to employ still more men; to spread the
benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to
help them build up their lives and their homes."54  Despite this
apparently benevolent intent,55 the Dodge court unequivocally
46. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
47. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 (Del. 2000) ("The Board is responsible for
considering only material facts that are reasonably available, not those that are immaterial or out
of the Board's reasonable reach.") (emphasis in original).
48. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
49. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
50. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
51. Id. at 684.
52. Id. at 671.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Interestingly, although Henry Ford's stated purpose was to reinvest in the company in
order to promote expansion and employee well-being, his true purpose was likely to avoid
providing capital to the Dodge brothers-Ford Co. shareholders who had decided in 1913 to
begin manufacturing a line of vehicles that would compete with the Ford Model T. D. Gordon
Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 277, 316 (1998).
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rejected this business decision by holding that the corporation is to
be operated "primarily for the profit of the stockholders,"56 and that
directors must exercise their authority solely to that end. 57 Thus, the
court decided that the board could not reduce shareholder profits "in
order to devote them to other purposes." 58
The Dodge court held that the board was obligated to act in good
faith and to maximize shareholder profits. " The directors had a
certain amount of discretion in their decisions, but that discretion
was limited to choosing the appropriate means to maximize
shareholder wealth.6" The directors were not entitled to decide
whether or not to pursue the ultimate end of wealth maximization. 61
Despite the holdings of early cases such as Dodge, more
recently, courts have shown more deference to board decisions,
thanks to the development of the business judgment rule. The
business judgment rule operates as a presumption in favor of the
board's decisions so long as certain prerequisites are met.62 In other
words, the business judgment rule makes it difficult for shareholders
to prevail on a claim against the board for breach of a fiduciary duty
because of judicial deference to the judgment of the directors. Under
the business judgment rule, a shareholder has the burden of rebutting
the presumption that the board's decision was made in good faith and
with due care. 63
The policy underlying the business judgment rule is deference to
corporate decision makers. ' Courts prefer to defer to business
people who make legitimate business decisions instead of
56. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Douglas M. Branson, The
Indiana Supreme Court Lecture: The Rule That Isn't a Rule-The Business Judgment Rule, 36
VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 632 (2002).
63. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) ("[D]irectors' decisions will be
respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the
decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business
purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider
all material facts reasonably available."); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 ("It is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.").
64. Branson, supra note 62, at 654.
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retroactively analyzing those decisions with the benefit of 20/20
hindsight. 65 This, in turn, encourages informed risk-taking,66 which
is desirable because it promotes innovation and growth. 
6 7
Courts have consistently applied the business judgment rule so
long as a particular board decision has some rational benefit
extending to the shareholders.68 Shlensky v. Wrigley69 is a prime
example of judicial deference engendered by the business judgment
rule. In Shlensky, a shareholder of an incorporated professional
baseball organization sued the board of directors for refusing to
install lights at the baseball field owned by the corporation. 7' The
shareholder contended that the decision to not install lights resulted
in lost revenue because the team could not play night games.71
Arguably, this refusal caused reduced attendance at weekday games
in comparison to weekend home games and weeknight road games. 72
The Shlensky court, however, held that the board did not breach
its duty of care. 73  The court stated that the board was free to
consider the corporation's long-term interest in the property value,
which might otherwise be jeopardized by night games that could lead
to the deterioration of the surrounding neighborhood. 7' Because
there was no evidence of "fraud, illegality or conflict of interest,"75
the board was free to make its decision irrespective of whether or not
65. See Roselink Investors, L.L.C. v. Shenkman, 386 F. Supp. 2d 209, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
("[T]he business judgment rule is intended to protect directors against just such attacks because
their decisions are not to be second-guessed by courts with the benefit of hindsight."); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. UAL Corp., 717 F. Supp. 575, 582 (N.D. Il. 1989) ("[Tjhe judiciary,
pursuant to the teachings of the business judgment rule, refrains from judging in hindsight the
decisions of directors, who, in any event, are presumably better versed in the operation of the
business world.").
66. Branson, supra note 62, at 632.
67. 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. c (1994) ("For efficiency reasons, corporate decisionmakers
should be permitted to act decisively and with relative freedom from a judge's or jury's
subsequent second-guessing. It is desirable to encourage directors and officers to enter new
markets, develop new products, innovate, and take other business risks.").
68. See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
69. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Il. App. Ct. 1968).
70. Id. at 778.
71. Id. at 777-78.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 781.
74. Id. at 780.
75. Id.
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it was "correct." 6  In practical terms, so long as directors can
demonstrate that their decision was made with the interests of the
corporation in mind, even if those interests are long-term and
somewhat tangential or attenuated, the business judgment rule will
generally protect the directors from liability. "
Despite the presumed validity of board decisions, the business
judgment rule will not protect a board whose actions exceed the
bounds of rational business judgment. 7 This is likely to occur when
a board makes a decision in bad faith or on an uninformed basis. 9
The classic example of a board's failure to make an informed
decision is Smith v. Van Gorkom. "
In Van Gorkom, the court held that the board breached its duty
of care by failing to adequately inform itself of all pertinent
information prior to approving the sale of the corporation. " A group
of shareholders sought the rescission of a cash-out merger between
two corporations: Trans Union Corporation and a subsidiary of
Marmon Group, Inc. 2 The transaction went through at $55 per share
of Trans Union stock, but at no point was a formal valuation of Trans
Union performed. 3 Rather, management "ran the numbers" at $50
and $60 per share and performed a feasibility study at $55 per
share. " Trans Union's CEO, who was also a board member,
spearheaded this effort without informing the rest of the board. 15
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 214 (Del. 1991) (refusing to hold the board
liable for authorizing a large stock repurchase); Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807,
812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976) (holding that absent fraud, oppression, or breach of trust, the
shareholders did not have a cause of action against the board for negligent dividend declaration),
affid, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993, 994 (App. Div. 1976).
78. When a board decision exceeds the bounds of rational business judgment, the
presumption in favor of the board no longer applies. This makes it extremely difficult for the
board to justify its conduct and enhances the likelihood that the court will find a breach of duty.
79. See Robert F. Blomquist, Six Thinking Hats for the Lorax: Corporate Responsibility and
the Environment, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 691, 698-99 (2006) ("For corporate officers' or
directors' decisions to be regarded as 'irrational,' and thus not protected by the business judgment
rule, the decisions must go so far beyond the bounds of reasonable business judgment that their
only explanation is bad faith.").
80. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
81. Id. at 893.
82. Id. at 863.
83. Id. at 869.
84. Id. at 865-66.
85. Id. at 865-68.
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When Trans Union's CEO finally presented the idea of the
merger to the board in a meeting that lasted two hours, the board
voted in favor of the merger based on the limited information orally
presented by the CEO.86 Although the board members were all
experienced professionals, 8 7 the plaintiffs were able to establish that
the board did not adequately inform itself of all relevant
information. 88 As a consequence, the plaintiffs successfully rebutted
the presumption in favor of the board provided by the business
judgment rule. 89 Without the defense of the business judgment rule,
the board was unable to establish that it did not violate its duty of
care. 90
c. Modified duties in the takeover context
When a corporation is an acquisition target, the business
judgment rule is modified so that the board's response to a takeover
receives heightened scrutiny. Amid the takeover frenzy of the
1980s, 9 the Delaware Supreme Court decided a series of cases that
have come to shape the duties of directors in the acquisition context.
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.," the court upheld the
board's adoption of a defensive recapitalization in the face of a
hostile takeover. 9' The court ruled that where a defensive measure
adopted by the board is potentially motivated by entrenchment, the
business judgment rule does not automatically apply. 4 Instead, the
burden is on the board to establish that there is a reasonably
perceived threat to the corporate enterprise 95 and that the measure
adopted is "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."96
In the wake of Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled on
another takeover lawsuit in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
86. Id. at 874.
87. Id. at 880.
88. Id. at 874.
89. See id. at 878.
90. See id. at 881.
91. See Springer, supra note 39, at 92.
92. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
93. See id. at 949.
94. Id. at 953-55.
95. See id. at 954.
96. Id. at 955.
THE DOUBLE BOTTOM LINE
Holdings, Inc. 9 7 Revlon involved an unfriendly tender offer98 to
Revlon shareholders by Pantry Pride. 99 In addition to Pantry Pride, a
second company, Forstmann, was engaged in the bidding process. 100
The Revlon board had decided to sell the company; the only
unresolved issues were to whom and for what value the company
would be sold. "' Ultimately, the board agreed to sell Revlon at a
lower price to Forstmann despite receiving a higher offer from
Pantry Pride. 02 Among other factors, the Revlon board felt that the
Forstmann deal would better protect the interests of certain
noteholders (an example of a nonshareholder constituencies) with
whom the board was concerned. 103
The Revlon court held that the board breached its duty to Revlon
shareholders by not seeking the highest price possible in the sale of
the corporation. '04 The court reasoned:
A board may have regard for various constituencies in
discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders. However,
such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate
when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and
the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate
enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder. 05
As the Revlon court makes clear, when a corporation has
abandoned its long-term strategies and has entered auction mode
(what this Note terms "Revlon land"), the sole fiduciary duty of the
board is to maximize immediate shareholder value. 106
The Revlon decision suggests that a Delaware corporation
committed to the double bottom line cannot maintain that
commitment once its sale is imminent. This is because once the
board puts the company up for sale, Revlon requires that the board
97. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
98. For a detailed description of tender offers, see HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 30, at
409-12.
99. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175.
100. Id. at 178.
101. Id. at 178-79.
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 185.
105. Id. at 182 (citation omitted).
106. See id. at 182, 184 n.16.
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pursue the highest price possible. 107 Just as Revlon could not attempt
to protect noteholders' interests to the detriment of shareholders'
interests by accepting Forstmann's lower offer, the board of a
Delaware corporation may also be barred from accepting a lower
purchase price in order to guarantee the continuation of CSR.
2. Responsibilities to Nonshareholders:
Constituency Statutes
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court articulated a policy
requiring the maximization of shareholder returns in the event that
the corporation is sold. 108 While the Delaware courts have pursued
that policy, many state legislatures pursued an alternative policy
embodied in constituency statutes. 109 Constituency statutes
essentially permit directors to consider, to varying degrees,
nonshareholder interests when making corporate decisions. 110 At
least on their face, constituency statutes provide a legislative
alternative to the developing case law originating in the ever-
influential Delaware courts.
a. Origins
A majority of states have enacted some form of constituency
statute. "' While the true impetus behind early constituency statutes
is the subject of debate,"1' most commentators believe that the
statutes have been a response to the frenzied hostile takeover 13
107. Analysis of precisely when the Revlon duties are triggered is beyond the scope of this
Note. To simplify, discussion throughout this Note assumes that the types of acquisitions at issue
do implicate a Revlon analysis.
108. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
109. In fact, it is likely that the early adopters of constituency statutes were reacting to the
outcome of cases like Unocal and Revlon. See Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A
Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1361-69 (1991),
110. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2005); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
516(a) (West 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (2007).
111. See supra note 13.
112. It is unclear whether constituency statutes were knee-jerk reactions to the sudden
popularity of hostile takeovers or whether they had been developed over a longer period of time.
113. A hostile takeover occurs when an outside party (usually another corporation or a group
of investors) makes a bid on the target company without the approval of the target company's
board of directors. The bidder generally offers the shareholders a substantial premium over the
market price of the shares. THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 114 (2005). Because the shareholders would receive a high
premium over the current value of their shares, directors risk breaching their fiduciary duty if they
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activity of the 1980s. 114 The increased popularity of unfriendly
takeovers left the directors of acquisition targets scrambling to find
ways to fend off hostile bidders without breaching the fiduciary
duties they owed to shareholders. "5 Consequently, management
lobbied state legislatures to adopt constituency statutes as a potential
solution to this problem. 116
In 1983, Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt a
constituency statute. 17 Since then, a majority of states have
followed suit by enacting some form of constituency statute. "8
Although shareholders of the target company usually stand to benefit
financially from a hostile takeover, the nature of a takeover often
puts the target's nonshareholder constituencies at risk. 19 Thus, by
allowing directors to consider nonshareholder interests, constituency
statutes theoretically allow a board to reject a takeover even if it is in
the best financial interest of the shareholders.
b. Components of constituency statutes
Although the specific language of the statutes varies from state
to state, the unifying principle common to all constituency statutes is
that they enable corporate directors to consider interests other than
those of their shareholders when exercising their corporate decision-
initiate an anti-takeover maneuver, such as a poison pill. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
114. Corinne Ball, Advising the Board of Directors, in A GUIDE TO MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 763, 795 (Richard A. Goldberg ed., 2007).
115. Gary von Stange, Corporate Social Responsibility Through Constituency Statutes:
Legend or Lie?, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 461, 467-68 (1994).
116. Seeid.at489.
117. Hansen, supra note 109, at 1355 n.4.
118. See supra note 13.
119. This is particularly true when the takeover is structured as a leveraged buyout ("LBO").
In an LBO, the target company essentially pays for itself by taking on a large amount of debt
secured by the target's assets. This puts employees at risk since the acquiring entity often reduces
the number of employees and even eliminates entire divisions to reduce operating costs in order
to service the debt load assumed to finance the acquisition. Additionally, the target company's
creditors are placed at risk if the company is unable to service its debt. See Bay Plastics, Inc. v.
BT Commercial Corp. (In re Bay Plastics, Inc.), 187 B.R. 315 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995) (involving
an LBO where the acquired company was forced to file bankruptcy).
An additional risk to stakeholders associated with hostile takeovers is the possibility that
the acquiring party intends the takeover to be a "bust-up bid." In bust-up bids, the bidder
acquires an underperforming company and sells off its component parts in order to make a profit.
MAYNARD, supra note 113, at 81.
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making authority. 120 Some common provisions include the
following:
1. The board of directors of a corporation may' 21 consider
the interests and effects of any action upon
nonshareholders. 122
2. The relevant nonshareholder groups include employees,
suppliers, customers, creditors, and communities. 123
3. The directors may consider both long-term and short-term
interests of the corporation. 124
4. The directors may consider local and national
economies. 121
5. The directors may consider any other relevant social
factors. 126
Most constituency statutes are permissive, as exemplified by the
Pennsylvania statute. 127 The Pennsylvania constituency statute
reads:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the
board of directors, committees of the board and individual
directors of a domestic corporation may, in considering the
best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any
action upon employees, upon suppliers and customers of
the corporation and upon communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation are located, and all
other pertinent factors. 121
As the above statutory language shows, permissive constituency
statutes emphasize director discretion. On its face, the permissive
120. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 516(a) (West 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I IA, §
8.30(a)(3) (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e)(i)-(v) (2007).
121. Connecticut's constituency statute uses mandatory language rather than the permissive
language exemplified here. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2005).
122. See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 516(a); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 IA, § 8.30(a)(3).
123. See Karmel, supra note 20, at 1163. Recently proposed constituency statutes have
included the environment as a relevant nonshareholder interest that may be considered. See infra
notes 152-155 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 A, § 8.30(a)(3); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e)(ii),
(iv).
125. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e)(ii).
126. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. I IA, § 8.30(a)(3); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827(3) (West
2007).
127. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 516(a).
128. Id. (emphasis added).
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language buttresses CSR because the board has the discretion to
consider nonshareholder interests, should it choose to do so.
However, the statutes are permissive, not mandatory. 129 This
means that while directors have the authority to consider other
constituencies, they also have the discretion to not consider other
constituencies. In other words, directors are free to focus solely on
shareholder returns and to completely ignore the interests of
employees and creditors, among others. This point is illustrated by
the fact that these statutes do not provide these other constituencies
with a cause of action in the event that the board fails to consider
nonshareholder interests. 130
In contrast to Pennsylvania's constituency statute, Connecticut's
statute requires the board to consider nonshareholder interests when
exercising its decision-making authority. ' Yet, even Connecticut's
mandatory statute does not provide an enforcement mechanism for
nonshareholders to protect their interests. 32 In fact, some
constituency statutes go so far as to explicitly deny standing to
nonshareholder constituencies wishing to sue the board for its failure
to adequately consider their interests. ' Therefore, even in states
that require the board to consider nonshareholder constituencies, the
failure to do so can only be challenged by a shareholder through a
traditional breach of duty claim. "'
129. This is not universally true. Connecticut's constituency statute contains mandatory
language. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2005).
130. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (Gould 2008); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 516
(West 1995).
131. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756. The Connecticut statute provides, in pertinent part,
the following:
[A] director of a corporation . . . shall consider, in determining what he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation . . . (3) the interests of the
corporation's employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and
societal considerations including those of any community in which any office or other
facility of the corporation is located.
Id. (emphasis added).
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b).
134. It is unclear whether the failure to consider nonshareholder interests can be brought as a
standalone cause of action or if the shareholder must also assert a breach of duty claim.
Regardless, the court is unlikely to uphold any such claim. See infra Part III.
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c. Cases
Despite the multiple questions raised by constituency statutes,
there exists little relevant case law to provide answers. With respect
to the clear policy tension between constituency statutes and the
Revlon decision in the ever-persuasive Delaware courts, the
landscape is especially sparse. Since their enactment, courts have
interpreted constituency statutes in such a way as to fit them into the
well-established theoretical and dialectical framework established by
the traditional-duty analysis as it was modified by Revlon. Courts
are reluctant to interpret constituency statutes as supplanting the
shareholder-centric policies enunciated by Revlon. ' Instead,
constituency statutes currently function only to the extent that they
do not conflict with shareholder primacy. 36
One of the early cases that exemplifies this approach comes
from Pennsylvania. In Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, "' the
defendant corporation's board of directors adopted a stock
reclassification plan to defend against a hostile tender offer. 138 The
Pennsylvania court upheld the defensive measure, noting that "[i]t
was proper for the company to consider the effects the . . . tender
offer would have, if successful, on the Company's employees,
customers and community." 139 Despite the court's acknowledgement
that the board could consider nonshareholder interests, the court
nonetheless emphasized that the board's fiduciary duty is to act in
the best interest of the shareholders. 14 Ultimately, the court's
decision to uphold the company's anti-takeover measures turned on
the board's consideration of shareholder interests. 14, The outcome
would have been identical even without Pennsylvania's constituency
statute.
In Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 142 the
court ruled that the target board acted properly when it redeemed a
135. See infra Part III.
136. See id.
137. 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
138. Id. at 692.
139. Id. at 697.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis. 1989).
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poison pill ' in response to a tender offer. 144 Among other things,
the court found that the company acted reasonably when it
considered the effect the tender offer would have on the company's
employees, customers, and community. "I On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the decision on different grounds. Although
Wisconsin law applied, the court relied heavily on Delaware
precedent and limited its analysis to equity investors by dismissing
the lower court's "threat" analysis. 146 The Seventh Circuit further
held that "[a] policy denying investors the opportunity to accept a
substantial premium, based on remote 'threats,' is not easy to square
with the law of Delaware." "' Again, the traditional-duty framework
sharply limited any force behind the board's consideration of
nonshareholder interests.
In another poison pill case, the federal district court in Maine
permitted a company to delay a shareholder vote on whether to
redeem the pill for 120 days after a tender offer was made. 48 The
court held that 120 days was not an unreasonable amount of time,
noting that "[t]his is particularly so when Maine law suggests that the
Directors of a corporation, in considering the best interests of the
shareholders and corporation, should also consider the interests of
the company's employees, its customers and suppliers, and
communities in which offices of the corporation are located." 149
d. Modern trend: Constituency statutes as CSR tools
Notwithstanding the constituency statute's origin as an anti-
takeover device, 150 the drafters of recently proposed constituency
143. A poison pill is a takeover defense mechanism whereby a specified event or set of events
automatically triggers a corporate change, usually structural, which makes the company an
unattractive target for the prospective acquirer(s). See generally Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
The Share Purchase Rights Plan (1996), reprinted in THERESE H. MAYNARD, MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 513-18 (2005) (setting forth the terms of a
standard poison pill).
144. 708 F. Supp. at 1016.
145. Id. at 1012-13.
146. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 499 n.4 (7th Cir.
1989) ("Nothing in this opinion endorses the district court's rationale concerning these 'threats,'
which is in tension with recent Delaware cases." (applying the law of Wisconsin)).
147. Id.
148. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me. 1989).
149. Id. at 33.
150. See Ball, supra note 114.
Spring 2009]
786 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:765
statutes envision these statutes as tools to enable CSR. 151 Most
recently, the California legislature passed a bill that would allow
directors to consider nonshareholder interests, 152 which the governor
later vetoed. '51 In 2007, a very similar bill made its way through the
Washington legislature. 114 Each of these proposed statutes listed not
only employees, customers, and suppliers as relevant nonshareholder
constituencies, but also the environment. "' Moreover, the impetus
behind these bills was to encourage socially responsible corporate
behavior. 156 Some proponents of utilizing constituency statutes as
vehicles for CSR suggest that states with these statutes would attract
socially responsible businesses. "' This attractive business climate,
in turn, would foster innovation and competition among these
socially responsible businesses, encourage investment, and produce
greater gains, both financially and in terms of social responsibility. 158
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
Despite the wide adoption of constituency statutes, 159 these
statutes do not and cannot protect socially responsible corporations
in the competitive acquisition setting following Revlon. The courts'
inability to interpret constituency statutes outside the framework
established by Revlon is the consequence of the legislatures' failure
to clearly enunciate the public policy preferences signaled by
constituency statutes. This policy failure is itself the product of the
inability of constituency statutes to provide adequate interpretive
guidance to the courts.
15 1. See, e.g., Press Release, Cal. Assemblyman Mark Leno, Assemblyman Leno's Measure
to Restore California's Competitive Edge in Attracting Innovative Businesses Approved by
Legislature (Sept. 12, 2008) [hereinafter Press Release, Mark Leno].
152. Assem. B. 2944, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
153. Veto Message from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California (Sept. 30, 2008),
available at http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/AB2944_LenoVetoMessage.pdf.
154. H.B. 1111, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007).
155. See id.; see also Assem. B. 2944, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
156. See, e.g., Press Release, Mark Leno, supra note 151.
157. See Petra Pasternak, Shielding the Green: Bill Would Let Corporate Directors Consider
More 'Constituencies', THE RECORDER, Apr. 4, 2008, at 1-2. The author examines a California
attorney's observation that clients fear facing liability for pursuing their corporation's eco-
friendly and socially responsible practices, id. at 1, and further discusses another California
attorney who counseled a client with similar concerns to incorporate in a state that had a
constituency statute on the books. Id. at 1-2.
158. See id.
159. See supra note 13.
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A. More of the Same
With respect to general business decisions, the question is open
as to whether a corporation can truly sacrifice profits in the name of
social responsibility. 160 Although the business judgment rule seems
to give wide latitude to the board in its exercise of corporate powers,
the case law developing the business judgment rule "falls short of
unambiguously authorizing the pursuit of non-shareholder interests
other than instrumentally for the benefit of the shareholders." 161 If
the solitary impact of constituency statutes is that they permit a
corporation to engage in socially responsible behavior, but only so
long as there is some benefit to the shareholders, then the only fact of
substance proven is that shareholder primacy is in fact the sole
analytical model guiding corporate fiduciary compliance. This is
true even when the benefit to the shareholders is attenuated, such as
goodwill for the corporation. Likewise, this is true when the benefit
is contemplated and not actualized, as in Shlensky, 162 because
directors will not engage the corporation in socially responsible
activities without first calculating how to justify the conduct as
having some rational benefit to the shareholders. 163
While philosophically unclear, 164 the business judgment rule
allows the board of directors to justify socially responsible activity so
long as the board can rationally point to a theoretical benefit that may
accrue to the shareholders. In practice, then, constituency statutes
appear to be superfluous with respect to general business decisions in
light of the common law. 165 The presence of a constituency statute in
160. See Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 533, 557-58 (2006).
161. Id.
162. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
163. Admittedly, finding a justification to satisfy the business judgment rule may not be very
difficult in the real world, but the requirement does seem to cut against the very principles behind
B Corporations and corporate social responsibility, which envision the corporation as being
socially responsible for the sake of being socially responsible.
164. The business judgment rule is philosophically unclear. On the one hand, it is driven by a
policy favoring deference to business people and a hesitance to pass judgment on business
decisions retroactively with the benefit of hindsight. On the other hand, the business judgment
rule essentially allows the board to justify any conduct as long as it can produce some rationale
for why the decision would potentially benefit the shareholders.
165. In fact, the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws argued that this should represent the full
extent of constituency statutes. The Committee wrote:
The Committee believes that the better interpretation of these statutes, and one that
avoids [sacrificing shareholder primacy], is that they confirm what the common law
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a state lacking a rich body of fiduciary duty case law, at a minimum,
makes explicit what was otherwise implicit in the common law
developed outside of that state. In other words, constituency statutes
at least make clear that a board of directors may consider interests
other than those of the shareholders when making corporate
decisions. 166
The real weakness of constituency statutes is highlighted when a
socially responsible corporation is for sale, as illustrated by the initial
Healthy Drink hypothetical. Constituency statutes are essentially
rendered impotent in this scenario. 167 As discussed below, even
though a few takeover cases in states with constituency statutes have
acknowledged the existence of the statutes, the statutes themselves
have not been dispositive in these decisions. 168 None of the courts in
the cases identified in the following section explicitly confronted the
issue of whether, in a multiple-bidder Revlon style acquisition, the
board can sacrifice a higher price for promised continuation of
socially responsible initiatives. Rather, the courts merely mentioned
the constituency statutes and then proceeded to rule on grounds
consistent with common law principles that preceded the advent of
the constituency statute.
The decision in Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier 169 evidences
the inadequacy of constituency statutes to protect nonshareholder
interests during the sale of a company. In Baron, which involved a
single-party takeover attempt, 70 the court avoided addressing
whether nonshareholder constituency interests could trump
shareholder interests. Instead, the court focused on the future
success of the company, stating:
has been: directors may take into account the interests of other constituencies but only
as and to the extent that the directors are acting in the best interests, long as well as
short term, of the shareholders and the corporation. While the Delaware courts have
related the consideration directors may give other constituencies to the interests of
shareholders by stating there must be "rationally related benefits to shareholders," it
may well be that other courts may choose other words with which to express the nexus.
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45
Bus. LAW. 2253, 2269 (1990).
166. Of course, this says nothing as to the appropriate prioritization of these often competing
interests.
167. See discussion supra Part II.B. 1.c.
168. See infra text accompanying notes 169-178.
169. 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
170. See id. at 691.
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[T]he fiduciary duty of corporate directors "to act in the
best interests of the corporation's shareholders . . . requires
the directors to attempt to block takeovers that would [in
their judgment] be harmful to the target company," and
"directors are obliged to oppose tender offers deemed to be
'detrimental to the well-being of the corporation even if that
[opposition] is at the expense of the short-term interests of
the individual shareholders."' 171
As this passage reflects, instead of directly addressing whether
consideration of nonshareholder interests by itself was sufficient to
justify the board's decision, the court fell back on the familiar
justification of protecting or benefiting the shareholders. As a result,
the court was able to side-step an analysis of the appropriate weight
that should be assigned to constituency statutes relative to other
policies.
In Keyser v. Commonwealth National Financial Corp., 172 the
court did a similar dance to avoid addressing Pennsylvania's
constituency statute. In Keyser, a group of shareholders sued the
corporation after the directors "knowingly sacrificed dollars for
social issues, refused to hold an auction after the company was in
play, stonewalled a willing bidder and finally eliminated that bidder
with a lock-up for insufficient consideration." 173 The court noted
that Pennsylvania's constituency statute permits directors to consider
the effects of any action upon employees, customers of the
corporation, and the community. ' However, the court
acknowledged that this consideration is not appropriate under Revlon
because Delaware has not adopted a constituency statute. '
Consequently, the court ruled that "[t]he extent to which price could
be sacrificed for these so-called social issues in the factual context of
this case is not a proper determination for the court." 176 Again, the
court effectively avoided addressing the extent to which constituency
statutes permit sacrificing profits for the benefit of nonshareholders
in the acquisition setting.
171. Id. at 697 (quoting Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 686 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
172. 675 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
173. Id. at 254.
174. Id. at 265-66.
175. Id. at 265.
176. Id. at266.
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These cases demonstrate the general reluctance of courts to
interpret constituency statutes to allow a corporation's board to
sacrifice profits for the benefit of nonshareholder constituencies.
This outcome should be expected since the courts routinely couch
their evaluative discourse in the terminological and analytical
framework established by the traditional-duty analysis. 177 In fact, as
noted above, some courts have explicitly acknowledged that to the
extent the interpretation of constituency statutes contradicts the
common law, as established predominantly in Delaware, such
interpretation is suspect. "'
B. Confusion over Policy
These cases present a curious truth. Courts seem to be
interpreting constituency statutes to essentially add nothing to the
existing law. Yet, both common sense and prevailing theories of
statutory interpretation suggest that this could not have been the
legislative intent. 179 After all, the process of passing laws can be
arduous. ' Why then do courts seem to hold that legislators passed
these constituency statutes with no intention of increasing the
board's authority to consider broader constituencies? Perhaps the
answer lies in the result of a debate held seventy years ago.
In a series of law review articles published in the 1930s,
Professors Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd debated the appropriate
role of the corporation. 8' Professor Berle was an early proponent of
the shareholder primacy model and believed strongly that all
177. For example, in Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier, the court discussed the reasonableness
of the board's response to a hostile takeover in relation to the threat posed. 646 F. Supp. 690, 697
(E.D. Pa. 1986). This analysis tracks the framework laid out by the Delaware Supreme Court in
the Unocal decision. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
178. See supra notes 142-147 and accompanying text.
179. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case
Study, 94Nw. U. L. REV. 1409, 1411-12 (2000).
180. Even if a proposed law survives numerous amendments and anticipated attacks, and
passes through the legislature, it is still subject to the executive's veto.
181. Compare Adolf Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049,
1049 (1931) (arguing that "all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a
corporation . . . are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all
shareholders as their interest appears") with E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (warning against emphasizing "the
view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their
stockholders," and instead promoting a view of the corporation "as an economic institution which
has a social service as well as a profit-making function...").
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corporate activity should be evaluated in terms of the extent to which
it benefits the company's shareholders. 182 Berle was concerned with
the evolving corporate structure that gave opportunistic corporate
managers the power to engage in self-dealing to the detriment of
relatively unorganized shareholders. 183 In Berle's view, although a
particular exercise of corporate power may be motivated by a self-
interested management, if the exercise of corporate power benefits
the shareholders, then shareholder oppression is avoided. 184 Wealth
maximization, therefore, serves as an objective measurement of
shareholder benefit. 185
Professor Dodd offered an alternative view of the corporation. 186
Whereas Berle was concerned with the ability of self-interested
management to oppress shareholders, Dodd was concerned with
protecting society from oppressive corporations. 187 Professor Dodd
viewed "all business as affected with a public interest." 188 In other
words, Dodd believed that corporations serve a public utility beyond
furnishing shareholders with profit and maximizing wealth. 189
Unlike Berle, who believed that the separation of ownership and
management allowed management to exploit shareholders, 190 Dodd
perceived this separation as providing an opportunity for
management to use their governance authority for the good of
society. 191
Most commentators seem to agree that the shareholder primacy
model derived from Professor Berle's position has prevailed as the
more persuasive and predominant form of corporate governance. 192
In fact, one need not look far beyond the title of Nobel Laureate and
economist Milton Friedman's 1970 article The Social Responsibility
182. Berle, supra note 181, at 1049.
183. Wells, supra note 22.
184. Id.
185. Berle, supra note 181, at 1049.
186. Dodd, supra note 181, at 1148.
187. Id. at 1147-48.
188. Id. at 1149.
189. See id.
190. Berle, supra note 181, at 1049.
191. Dodd, supra note 181, at 1148.
192. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate
Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 109 (2004).
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of Business is to Increase its Profits ' to see the persuasiveness of
Berle's position. Scholars have echoed this view. 114
Despite the far-reaching support for the shareholder primacy
model, ' the current CSR movement and the recent wave of
proposed constituency statutes revive and embody Professor Dodd's
position. 196 However, the predominance of the shareholder primacy
view has resulted in the courts' inability to address the validity of
constituency statutes without falling back on the shareholder primacy
paradigm. ' It is this failure to break with the traditional
shareholder wealth maximization principles that prevents
constituency statutes from adequately protecting CSR in the
acquisition context in light of Revlon.
The inability of the courts to interpret constituency statutes as
distinct from the traditional-duty framework is predicated not only
on the courts' adherence to the traditional framework, but also on
their uncertainty over how to apply constituency statutes
independently. The traditional framework fosters a system of
adjudicatory rationality by simplifying the board's duty-
maximizing shareholder return. 198 In other words, the law has
developed in the acquisition context by identifying profit
maximization as the normative ideal and articulating norms (i.e.,
fiduciary duties) in terms of the minimum acceptable conduct that
directors must follow. 199
The alternative system, which constituency statutes strive for,
acknowledges the relevant interests of multiple constituencies and
allows corporate directors to seek preference maximization in the
aggregate. 200 The choice of adjudicative rationality allows the courts
193. Friedman, supra note 31.
194. See DAVID C. BAYNE, S.J., THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL: A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 126 (1986) ("The overarching objective of the corporate entity is
its own common good, which is generally to make profits.").
195. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439 (2001) (arguing that not only has the shareholder primacy model proven to be the
dominant model in American corporate law, but that all economies are converging toward this
model).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 150-158.
197. See supra Part III.A.
198. Joseph Biancalana, Defining the Proper Corporate Constituency: Asking the Wrong
Question, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 425, 428 (1990).
199. See id. at 429.
200. See id. at 430.
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to avoid confronting the complex decision matrix, which a board
must necessarily analyze when trying to prioritize competing
preferences. 201 Instead, the directors are able to focus on a strict set
of well-established normative principles to frame the proper course
of conduct for a company faced with the prospect of being acquired.
Consequently, the interpretation of constituency statutes can be
explained as the product of administrative convenience, even though
its policies compete with the traditional-duty analysis.
C. Lack of Guidance
The traditional view is that the legislature is responsible for
formulating rules to achieve public policy. 202 However, the courts'
inability to break from the normative, analytically convenient
framework suggests that constituency statutes fail to provide
adequate guidance for their application. This indicates that the
legislatures have failed to clearly articulate the policies underpinning
these statutes. 203 As a result, judges are left to make the statutes fit
within the pre-existing duty framework. 204
Moreover, the lack of case law interpreting constituency statutes
in the acquisition context2"5 almost certainly guarantees that
management will be counseled to choose a topping bid over a bid
promising the continuation of CSR. This is because there is no legal
authority protecting a board that rejects a higher value bid out of
consideration for nonshareholder interests. Instead, Revlon and its
far-reaching precedent provide authority for punishing management
201. Admittedly, preferences are not necessarily in competition. See Greenwood, supra note
28, at 1061. However, the point is that the decision-making process becomes exponentially more
difficult when the board must consider the interests of more and more groups.
202. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common
Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REv. 875, 876 (1991).
203. This may be explained in part by the fact that despite the recent attempt to use
constituency statutes to support corporate social responsibility, a majority of currently enacted
constituency statutes were designed to be anti-takeover devices. See Ball, supra note 114.
204. William W. Bratton, Confronting the Ethical Case Against the Ethical Case for
Constituency Rights, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1449, 1468 (1993). Bratton argues that as a result
of constituency statutes being adopted at the behest of management as an anti-takeover tool,
"enactment did not force the implications of constituency empowerment forward as matter for
legislative consideration. These facts invite an ordinarily cautious interpreting judge to fit the
statues into corporate law's inherited framework of management empowerment: Since
constituency rights disempower managers, the statutes do not imply them." Id.
205. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
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for not accepting the higher bid. 206 Since constituency statutes are
merely permissive. 7 and lack an enforcement mechanism, they do
little more than give boards the legislative permission to consider the
effects of an acquisition on nonshareholder constituencies.
Consequently, a board can disregard these interests without fearing
shareholder backlash.
Furthermore, constituency statutes in their current form apply to
all corporations, not only to corporations interested in pursuing the
double bottom line. 208 Because not all corporations have socially
responsible agendas, the courts are rightfully hesitant to apply
constituency statutes in a way that permits sacrificing profits for the
public benefit. Apprehension over setting questionable precedent for
strictly profit-maximizing firms arguably prevents courts from
applying constituency statutes to corporations that are truly
committed to the double bottom line.
Finally, constituency statutes do not provide any guidance as to
the relevant weight directors should afford to nonshareholder
interests. 209 Even Connecticut's mandatory constituency statute 210
does not indicate what weight, if any, nonshareholder interests
should receive relative to shareholder interests. 211 Consequently, the
courts refer back to the traditional framework where shareholder
interests receive top priority, often to the exclusion of any
nonshareholder interests.
IV. PROPOSAL
The inability of constituency statutes to adequately safeguard
CSR in the acquisition setting cannot be remedied solely by an
internal restructuring of the statutes themselves. Constituency
statutes can only allow CSR to survive Revlon land if the legislature
206. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
207. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756 (West 2005); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (Gould
2008); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 516 (West 1995).
208. Each currently enacted constituency statute appears to apply to all corporations in the
state where the statute is in force, although in some states the statutes only apply in the takeover
context. James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes in the
1990s, 21 STETSON L. REv. 97, 106 (1991).
209. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756; 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 516; VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. I IA, § 8.30 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e) (2007).
210. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756.
211. Id.
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clearly understands the public policy it is promoting. Therefore,
legislatures must then clearly articulate this policy in the language of
the statutes and give the statutes the requisite force necessary to
guide the courts in enforcing this public policy.
A. Clarifying the Role of Corporations
The debate over the appropriate role for corporations in society
is just as lively and unresolved today as it was for Berle and Dodd
nearly three-quarters of a century ago. 212 As entities created by state
authority, corporations should be governed in accordance with policy
choices promulgated by the state legislatures. This governance, in
turn, will allow corporations to help further the ends of the states'
public policies. 213
Constituency statutes embody one such public policy choice.
For example, California's most recently proposed constituency
statute was prompted by a desire to encourage socially responsible
corporations to incorporate in California. 2 14 The motivation behind
the bill is in line with the developing socially and environmentally
aware policy vision taking shape in the state. 25 Although the
constituency statute was ultimately vetoed,2 '6 this is the type of
convergence of policy and law that is necessary for constituency
statutes to effectively protect CSR in the acquisition context.
212. Compare Tara J. Radin, Stakeholders and Sustainability: An Argument for Responsible
Corporate Decision-Making, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 363 (2007) (arguing that
business should not rely on law to determine responsible decision-making) with Lynn A. Stout,
Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189 (2002)
(evaluating the strength of various arguments in favor of the shareholder primacy model).
213. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS &
PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 153 (2006). Greenfield argues:
When we begin to understand the true role of corporations in our modern society, we
are able to see corporate law not just as a tool to help businesses govern their internal
affairs but also as a mechanism to bring about needed changes in other areas of public
policy. Corporate law can be a powerful tool of public policy ....
Id.
214. See Press Release, Mark Leno, supra note 151 ("AB 2944 is important to help attract and
retain these leading-edge companies .... ").
215. For example, the state recently entered into a partnership with SunEdison to provide
affordable solar energy to fifteen California State University campuses. Press Release, Office of
the Governor: Arnold Schwarzenegger, Gov. Schwarzenegger Announces Partnership to Power
CSU Campuses with Solar Energy (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://gov.ca.gov/press-
release/10860/.
216. See Veto Message, supra note 153.
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In fact, the failed passage of California's constituency statute is
symptomatic of the policy confusion perpetuating the general
inability of constituency statutes as currently formulated to protect
CSR in the acquisition setting. California certainly prides itself in
taking the initiative and "lead[ing] the nation" in environmentally
friendly policies. 217 As a consequence of the executive veto of the
proposed statute, however, corporations can only engage in these
initiatives to the extent that "shareholder protections" are
maintained. 2"8
This apparent schizophrenia may be due to the fact that, as noted
above, a majority of currently enacted constituency statutes were not
initially motivated by CSR. 219 This helps explain the courts' failure
to analyze the relevance of constituency statutes in the acquisition
context without referencing the traditional fiduciary duty
framework. 22' Regardless, the states are free to reshape the
constituency statutes in light of the developing public policy that is
more responsive to socially responsible businesses. 221
B. Statutory Guidance
In conjunction with the clarification of public policy
preferences, legislatures must retool constituency statutes in order to
ensure that corporations devoted to the pursuit of the double bottom
line will be adequately protected in the acquisition setting. The
statutes must contain language that clearly signals analytical
independence from the traditional-duty framework. Specifically, the
statutes would be more effective if the corporation were required to
elect coverage. Once the corporation opts in, the statutes must
require consideration of nonshareholder interests, grant the board the
authority to assign varying weight to constituent interests, and set
forth an enforcement mechanism. The rationale for each of these
provisions is explained in turn below.
217. Fact Sheet, Office of the Governor: Arnold Schwarzenegger, Senate Bill 375:
Redesigning Communities to Reduce Greenhouse Gases (Oct. 1, 2008), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/fact-sheet/10707/.
218. Veto Message, supra note 153.
219. See Ball, supra note 114.
220. See supra Part III.
221. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14, 49 (1992) ("States have primary authority over questions of corporate
governance.").
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1. Opt In for Mandatory Consideration
of Other Constituencies
Constituency statutes will be more effective if corporations are
required to elect statutory coverage in their corporate charters. In the
early stages of entity formation, entrepreneurs and business owners
must decide whether to make the business a corporation, partnership,
or some form of limited liability entity. 222 They must also determine
the company's capital structure and how investors will realize
returns. 223 Requiring the corporation to affirmatively elect to be
covered by the constituency statute permits the traditional framework
to apply where election is not made in the corporate charter. This
allows corporations that wish to be governed by the well-established
traditional principles to choose to do so. Simultaneously, it requires
a corporation that wishes to pursue the double bottom line to actively
protect itself through such an election.
Requiring corporations to elect coverage ensures that investors
will be on notice of the fact that the investors' preferences, at least in
terms of strict wealth maximization, will not necessarily have
priority over the interests of other constituencies. This requirement
has the potential added benefit of allowing a corporation to attract
investors who would prefer to invest in socially responsible
businesses as opposed to companies that do not elect statutory
coverage.
Additionally, requiring a corporation to opt in protects
shareholders of corporations that have not elected statutory coverage.
Shareholders in non-electing companies are protected from directors
who might abuse the statute by attempting to retroactively justify a
board decision by citing the interests of other constituencies, since
directors must first obtain shareholder approval to amend the charter
and elect statutory coverage. 224 As a result, nonshareholder
preferences may consequently receive higher priority than
shareholder interests, but shareholders have the authority to permit or
deny such an outcome. This allows the retention of some balance to
protect the shareholders, while ultimately permitting the directors to
222. See generally HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 30, at 1-23.
223. Id.
224. Shareholder approval is generally required for any fundamental changes to the
corporation, including amending the document of incorporation. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 902
(West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (2008); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 10.03(e) (2002).
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sacrifice shareholder profits for the public benefit in an acquisition so
long as the shareholders had already approved statutory coverage.
Although coverage by the proposed constituency statute is
initially elective, once election is made, the consideration of
nonshareholder interests must be mandatory. Making the
consideration of nonshareholder interests mandatory in the statute, as
illustrated in Connecticut, 225 provides a clear signal to the courts that
the consideration of nonshareholder interests must be more than just
an afterthought. Mandatory consideration of nonshareholder
interests differentiates the proposed language from the majority of
constituency statutes currently enacted, 226 as well as the recently
failed California constituency statute. 227 It also enables the proposed
statute to more efficiently promote CSR. Mandatory consideration
ensures that the propriety of socially responsible corporate activity
can be evaluated irrespective of the traditional benefit-to-the-
shareholder analysis because the board is no longer free to
completely disregard nonshareholder interests in the name of profit
maximization.
2. Weight of Constituent Interests and Enforcement
Constituency statutes must also provide guidance as to the
appropriate weight the board may assign to nonshareholder interests.
The constituency statutes will continue to ineffectively protect CSR
in the acquisition context if they do not expressly indicate the weight
directors may assign to potentially competing interests. In weighing
the interests of various constituents, the interests of the shareholders
must not necessarily hold any priority over the interests of
nonshareholder constituencies. In fact, given the right
circumstances, it may be appropriate to assign more weight to
nonshareholder interests than to the interests of the shareholders.
The express legislative grant of discretion in this regard clearly
indicates to the courts that, depending on the nature of the
transaction, CSR is a legitimate end sought by directors.
Additionally, the absence of an enforcement mechanism in
constituency statutes in their current form contributes to their
225. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-756(d) (West 2005).
226. Connecticut's constituency statute does not require mandatory consideration of
nonshareholder interests. Id.
227. Assem. B. 2944, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008).
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impotence when it comes to protecting CSR for companies in
situations like Healthy Drink. 228  Even the CSR-minded statute
proposed in California contained a provision expressly denying a
cause of action for failure to consider non-constituent interests. 229
The lack of an enforcement mechanism leaves directors little choice
but to fall back on the traditional framework because there is only the
risk of a breach of duty claim. Therefore, constituency statutes need
to impose upon the board a duty to consider nonshareholder interests,
attribute the appropriate weight to them, and expressly state that this
duty is enforceable. 230
V. JUSTIFICATIONS
The proposed paradigm will likely be attacked on the grounds
that the suggested legislative action encourages self-interested
behavior among management. 231 Arguably, the proffered model
engenders unaccountability of the board by permitting directors to
justify self-interested conduct by claiming consideration of
nonshareholder constituencies. 23 Despite these concerns, the
proposed statute creates a presumption in favor of the validity of the
board's decision in the absence of bad faith, breach of fiduciary duty,
and self-dealing. This continues the policy rationale supporting the
business judgment rule,233 while simultaneously ensuring that
directors will not be able to successfully invoke the proposed statute
as a means to protect themselves against breach of duty claims.
While directors certainly may attempt to justify self-dealing in this
way, fact-finders and courts will be no less equipped to evaluate the
legitimacy of such claims merely because of the presence of the
proposed measures.
Another likely criticism of this proposal is that constituency
statutes further limit already minimal protections afforded to
228. See supra Part I.
229. Assem. B. 2944, 2007-2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008) ("Nothing in this section shall
create any duties owed by any director to any person or entity to consider or afford any particular
weight to any interest or factor described [in this section] .... ").
230. This will necessarily be a fact-sensitive determination.
231. Letter from Greg Hines, Legislative Dir. of Cal. Mfrs. & Tech. Ass'n., to Arnold
Schwarzenegger, Cal. Governor (Sept. 11, 2008), available at http://www.cmta.net/pdfs/
AB%202944.pdf.
232. von Stange, supra note 115, at 483; see also Wells, supra note 22, at 88-89.
233. Branson, supra note 62, at 632.
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shareholders through the board's fiduciary duties. 234 Nonshareholder
constituencies, such as employees, creditors, and suppliers, are able
to protect themselves through contractual relationships by
negotiating contract terms that reduce their exposure to potential
risks. 235 For example, a supplier can require payment of any
outstanding balance before shipping new goods. Similarly,
employees can demand higher compensation in response to a
reduction of fringe benefits. 236 In contrast, shareholders are only
protected by the board's obligation to adhere to its fiduciary duties.
As residual claimants, shareholders are not afforded the opportunity
of upfront negotiation, which is often accessible to nonshareholder
constituencies. 237 Arguably, when it comes to determining the
appropriate weight of nonshareholder interests, the board should not
have complete discretion to subvert shareholder interests in favor of
the interests of other constituencies. 238
Admittedly, constituency statutes can only do so much. As
noted previously, corporate law often involves a fact-intensive
analysis. 239 For instance, sometimes management itself is involved
in the acquisition of the company. 240 In such a situation, shareholder
value should be maximized in order to avoid the appearance of
impropriety, even if management has nothing but benevolent
intentions. Otherwise, constituency statutes would appear to permit
a board's self-interested conduct. Additionally, where the bidding
entities offer equal prospects for the continuation of the target's
CSR, the target's board would not be justified in failing to maximize
shareholder returns. 241
234. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 666-67 (2006).
235. Id. at 666.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 666-67.
238. See id. at 664-65.
239. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate
Law, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1205, 1233 (2001).
240. For example, in 1988 the management group of RJR Nabisco attempted a leveraged
buyout of the company before ultimately being outbid by the private equity group Kohlberg
Kravis Roberts & Co. See BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE:
THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (Harper & Row 1990), for an in-depth case study of this failed
management acquisition.
241. Again, these examples are not exhaustive. The appropriateness of a board's decision is a
complex factual determination that does not lend itself to a simple formulaic analysis.
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Moreover, the board must weigh the interests of shareholders
and nonshareholders in light of the acquiring entity's ability to
further the company's CSR mission. As with the board's duty to
fully inform itself of all relevant information in the traditional-duty
analysis, 242 the board must be fully informed and carefully scrutinize
the acquirer's vow to continue the company's CSR initiatives. This
is because if the board ultimately decides to accept a lower bid based
on the continuation of the company's CSR initiatives, the board must
perform a valuation of those initiatives. In other words, the board is
responsible for making sure that the furtherance of nonshareholder
interests is actually worth the particular difference between the
rejected higher-priced offer and the accepted lower-priced offer.
Most arguments opposing constituency statutes are premised on
an unrealistic conception of the "shareholder."243  Under the
traditional-duty analysis, the notion of the shareholder is in some
sense a legal fiction. 244 In other words, the traditional framework has
developed in a way that strips the shareholder of all the complexity
of a human being and instead understands the shareholder as having
the solitary aim of maximizing wealth. 245 This dehumanization of
the shareholder rationalizes the conflict between shareholders and
nonshareholder constituencies, and treats the interests of the two
groups as divergent.
Very frequently, however, there is a confluence of these
interests. Employees are often shareholders. Shareholders often
reside in the communities affected by corporate activity, and so
on. 246 Therefore, the proposed statutory framework allows the board
to acknowledge the very real possibility that in many situations, the
actual human beings owning the company's shares may prefer that
the corporation take actions that diminish the value of the shares or
reduce their returns. 247 The ancillary benefits of CSR may be more
valuable to the shareholder as human than strict profit maximization
242. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (discussing in detail the
corporate board's duty of care).
243. See, e.g., Greenwood, supra note 28, at 1025-27 (discussing the problems associated
with a simplistic notion of "shareholder").
244. Id. at 1025.
245. Id. at 1025-26.
246. See id. at 1063-64.
247. Id.
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is to the shareholder qua shareholder. 248 In some cases, sacrificing
shareholder profits can have a rational benefit to the shareholder
even where there is no continuing interest, as in the mandated sale of
a corporation.
A. Real Concerns
For companies that wish to pursue the double bottom line, the
inability of constituency statutes to uphold CSR values in the
takeover context is a true concern. The Healthy Drink
hypothetical 249 describes a very real problem. Large corporations
frequently acquire smaller, socially conscious brands. 250 As a B
Corporation founder, Ahmed Rahim has said, "The biggest fear of
any company like ours is that if we merge with a strategic partner,
will they try to strip our values away just to save on the cost of
goods?" 25' Moreover, socially responsible entrepreneurs may be
hesitant to incorporate in states that lack effective constituency
statutes. 252
B. Desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility
Although some opponents staunchly argue against the prudence
of CSR no matter the circumstances, 253 the claim that socially
responsible corporations are desirable is not entirely controversial.
However, when CSR functions to limit shareholder returns in the
acquisition context, where there is no chance for long-term
shareholder benefit, 254 the desirability of CSR comes into question.
But, from the perspective of social interests, while CSR entails
248. See id.
249. See supra Part 1.
250. See Ilana DeBare, For Philanthropy, B is Letter Perfect, S.F. CHRON., May 18, 2008, at
C1 (noting that Unilever acquired Ben & Jerry's in 2003, Colgate acquired Tom's of Maine in
2006, Clorox acquired Burt's Bees in 2007, and Coca-Cola acquired a 40 percent stake in Honest
Tea in 2008).
251. Id.
252. See Pasternak, supra note 157; see also SEN. R. COMM., ASSEM. B. 2944-BILL
ANALYSIS, at *5-6 (Aug. 25, 2008) available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/
ab_2901-2950/ab 2944_cfa_20080825_160055_sen floor.html (arguing that amending
California's corporation code to allow directors to consider nonshareholder interests would
restore California's competitive advantage).
253. See Friedman, supra note 31.
254. But see Greenwood, supra note 28, at 1063 (arguing that actual shareholders have real
interests other than maximizing the value of shares).
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sacrificing shareholder profits, it directly benefits a broader range of
individuals. "' In the Healthy Drink hypothetical, permitting the
board to enter into the transaction with Bidder 2 will benefit the
communities who harvest the ingredients, supplier communities, and
the environment. Permitting Healthy Drink to accept Bidder 2's
offer allows the corporation to internalize externalities that would
otherwise be created in a transaction with Bidder 1. 257 In turn, this
allows for the potential of a more efficient allocation of
preferences. 258 Although shareholders receive reduced financial
returns, informed investors are free to make the decision for
themselves as to whether they wish to invest in firms with express
double bottom lines or to invest in more traditional, profit-
maximizing firms. 259
Furthermore, moving away from a strictly normative view of
directors' duties encourages aspiration beyond mere compliance with
minimal acceptable conduct. 26 The board of directors is
traditionally viewed as being in the best position to assess the
business needs of the company. 261 Directors are generally more
qualified to determine optimal policies with respect to pollution,
employee management, environmental impact, and creditor and
supplier relationships, among other aspects of the corporation. 262 By
allowing directors to make these assessments and make decisions
that may optimize preferences on a broader scale, albeit by
potentially sacrificing some profits, the policy encourages over-
compliance with regulatory standards. 263 As part of CSR, many
corporations adopt their own standards with respect to the
255. Testy, supra note 24, at 1238.
256. See supra Part I.
257. For example, the increased volume of pollution that would result from abandoning the
more expensive, low-emission production processes is a burden that would be borne by society at
large and not internally by the company.
258. Biancalana, supra note 198, at 430.
259. Moreover, it is often the case that the board is comprised of some of the corporation's
biggest shareholders. If these board members are willing to sacrifice their own shareholder
returns in order to ensure continuation of the company's CSR agenda, then the legislature should
want to encourage this behavior.
260. Biancalana, supra note 198, at 431.
261. ConAgra, Inc. v. Cargil, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 576, 589 (Neb. 1986) (White, J., dissenting).
262. DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 162 (2005).
263. Id.
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environment, labor conditions, and other concerns, which go beyond
the minimal standards set by law. 264 Often, this over-compliance sets
standards across industries. 265 This phenomenon is, at least, partly
responsible for such advances as improved health and safety
conditions in factories, reduced deforestation, decreased greenhouse
gas emissions, and enhanced pressure on protecting human rights. 266
These gains are jeopardized by the adherence to strict profit
maximization, which encourages bare compliance with legal
standards, since to do otherwise risks reduced output at higher costs,
thereby reducing profits.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although not originally envisioned as such, constituency statutes
provide a potential tool for administering CSR even in the
acquisition setting. The statutory framework suggested by this Note
seeks to remedy identified inadequacies common to currently
enacted constituency statutes. The proposed model seeks to
explicitly identify preferred policies and clearly enunciate those
policies to guide the courts in their enforcement.
Just as the courts have had difficulty breaking from the
traditional-duty analysis, it is likely that the proposals contained in
this Note may prove troubling to the practitioner. Like the courts,
the corporate lawyer is accustomed to counseling the corporation in
the shadow of the traditional analytical framework. Disrupting this
principle may create uncertainty over which interests the attorney
should advise the directors to prefer with respect to a particular
decision. One possible solution to this problem is to require the
corporate charter to clearly lay out the priority of interests that must
be considered in corporate decision making. The wisdom of such a
requirement is unclear, however, because ultimately this would
amount to a substitution of shareholder primacy for the primacy of
another single group over all others. More likely, the practitioner
will be required to confront the more complex framework faced by
the board and the courts as well.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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Clearly, the difficulty lies in striking the appropriate balance
between shareholder interests and the interests of other
constituencies. With the growing movement of socially responsible
businesses and entrepreneurs, it is vital that the legislatures provide
clear guidance to the courts and validate these concerns. Shifting the
balance to enable corporations to increase social welfare at the
expense of profits can strengthen corporations by enhancing the
long-term viability of businesses and industries. A decision that
invalidates a board's decision that has a positive impact reaching
beyond attaining top dollar for shareholders risks hindering the
growth and sustainability of the economy as a whole.
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